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This paper studies a financial market where investors have to search for in-
vestment projécts. After identifying a profitaóle project, the investor bargains
with the project owner aóout the financial contract. Alternatively, the investor
may delegate search and bargaining to a financial intermediary Delegation may
be profitable since it reduces the project owner's share of the bargaining surplus.
The investor, however, cannot monitor the intermediary's search óehavior so that
delegation mayinduce excessively risky investments. This restricts the parameter
constellations undet which the investors prefer intermediation to direct investment.
Competition may not reduce the intermediaries'profits to zero because ofincentive
restrictions.
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1 Introduction
'I'liis pape~r dc,vc~lops a thc~eiry uf linancial intermediation based ou Lhe conuniturent e(Cects
of delegated search and bargaining. An intermediary is delegated the task of identifying
investment projects and negotiating loan contracts. The cost of information gathering
generates trade írictions that give rise to the function of intermediation. After identi-
fying a project, the financier finds himself in a situation of partial bilateral monopoly
with thr. entrepreneur because switching to another project is costly. Loan contracts are
deterrnined by a process of bilateral bargaining rather than by a competitive Walrasian
market. In such an environment, delegated bargaining may increase the fund owners'
share ofl,he project return.
'I~he~ iuvc~st.ors may prefer intertnediation Lo direcL investment because the "use of a
bargaining agent affects the power of commitmentn (Schelling (1980), p. 29). The inter-
mediary's repayment obligation to the depositors reduces the fraction of the bargaining
surplus that the entrepreneurs are able to appropriate. Indeed, direct investment suffers
from a tendency towards underinvestment because of a óold-up problem as described
by Williamson (1975). Search for an investment opportunity is a relationship-specific
investment. But, the search cost is sunk when the financier negotiates with an en-
trepreneur. The bargaining outcome dces not compensate the investor for his search
effort and, therefore, provides inefficient incentives to engage in search. This problem
can, at least partially, be solved by ex-ante contracting and delegating search to an in-
termediary. As a result, intermediation may generate a Pareto-improvement so that all
the market patticipants become better off.
The gains from intermediation are, however, limited by incentive restrictions. The
fund owner is unable to monitor the intermediary's search and bargaining behavior.
Also, the intermediary possesses no funds of his own so that the contract with the fund
owner is a limited liability arrangement. As a consequence, the intermediary is less con-
cerned about the risk of investment failure than the investor. He is inclined to selectz
excessively risky investments. To avoid this, the investor has to make search for low-risk
projects suíficiently attractive for the intermediary. As a consequence, he cannot ap-
propriat.e the total gains from intermediation. Even though the intermediaries compete
for funds, they may earn positive profits in equilibrium. This is consistent with perfect
compel,it.ion because t,he intermediary will search for mlatively safe projects only if his
expected payoff from se.arching is high enough. As a possible extreme, intermediation
may become unprofitable for the fund owners. When the incentive problems associated
with delegation are too severe, they prefer direct investment to intermediation. Then
the investors themselves engage in search to deal directly with the entrepreneurs. The
model endogenously determines the extent of the activity of the intermediaries.
Theories of financial intermediation are generally based on some cost advantage of
tt~e inter~riediaries. They either enjoy a comparative technological advantage to perform
financial transactions or they are able to exploit economies of scale associated with these
transactions. This paper completely abstracts from such technological considerations.
The fund owners and the intermediaries are endowed with the same search technology.
Also, the bargaining procedure is independent of whether the investor or the intermedi-
ary negotiates a loan contract with one of the entrepreneurs. This framework should not
deny the potential role of scaleeconomies for the activity of intermediation. Actually, the
model can easily be extended to accommodate cost advantages of delegated search. But,
we ignore such aspects to emphasize that intermediation may be viable even when it dces
not reduce transaction costs. In our model intermediation emerges because it affects the
distribution of the gains from trade. It makes financing a project more attractive for the
owners of liquid funds and helps to overcome an underinvestment problem. Furthermore,
the abstraction from scale economies allows us to study competition among intermedi-
aries without encountering the problem of equilibrium indeterminacy, which occurs with
non-c,onvex transaction technologies (see Matutes and Vives (1991) and Yanelle (1989)).
At least implicitly, already the early analysis of Gurley and Shaw (1960) employs
scale economies to explain the activity of intermediation. In their view, financial in-3
termodiaries transform primary securities issued by firms into the more liquid financial
securities de~sired by the fund owners. Intennediation is useful because indivisibilities
in financial trarisactions limit the amount of diversification that can be achieved under
direct finance. Diamond (1984) presents a different approach based on scale economies
in reducing problems oí asymmetric information. In his model, investment projects re-
quire funding from multiple investors. Therefore, delegating the task of supervising the
project to a single intermediary is cheaper than monitoring by all the individual lenders.
Pooling the funds of many lenders allows the intermediary to reduce the monitoring cost
per project. At the same time, he can diversify his portfolio by financing a large number
of projects. Diamond shows that these two effects may make intermediation more effi-
cient to cope with the incentive problems of the borrower-lender relationship than direct
finance.
Efliciency aspects are underlying also those explanations that view intermediaries as
marke~t. makcrs. In Lhcse modcls thc intertnediaries offer bid and ask prices Lo attracL
traders from both sides of the market. Direct trade is either not possible or requires
costly search for trading partners (see Stahl (1988) and Gehrig (1993)). The availability
of intermediation thus creates a superior transactions technology. A similar advantage
characterizxs the intermediaries in Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) bargaining and
matching framework. They consider buyers, sellers and intermediaries who are randomly
matched and then bargain over the terms of trade. The intermediaries enjoy a compara-
tive advantage in making contacts and, thereby, speed up the process of exchange. Since
each seller is randomly matched with a buyer or an intermediary, he cannot choose be-
tween direct and intermediated trade. In contrast with our model, therefore, both forms
of trade coexist in equilibrium.
The following section of the paper describes a stylized model of a financial market.
Section 3 analyses the investors' optimal search and bargaining strategy under direct
investment. Delegated search and bargaining is introduced in section 4. Section 5
studies the equilibrium configurations that emerge for different parameter constellations.4
Finally, section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a financial market with investors, entrepreneurs and intermediaries as the
relevant economic agents. Only the investors possess liquid funds that can be used
to finance investment projects. 'I'hese projects are owned by the entrepreneurs. !f a
liroject is financed, it yields a random return. The riskiness of returns depends on the
entrepreneur's type. The investor can allocate his funds to one of the projects in two
ways: FirsL, he may choose `direct investment' by spending some effort in searching
for a profitable project. After identifying a suitable investment, he bargains with the
entrepreneur about the financial contract. The second option is `intermediated invest-
ment', which amounts to delegating search and bargaining to one of the intermediaries.
In this case, the investor contracts only with the intermediary; there is no direct contact
between the investor and the entrepreneur who receives the funds. All agents are risk-
neutral and seek to maximize theit expected payoffs.
Each investor has some initial wealth W 1 0. The riskless interest rate is normal-
ized to zero and taken to be identical to the agents' common discount rate. Thus, the
investor's payoff is simply W if he decides not to invest his wealth. Direct investment
is costly because it requires search for an investment opportunity. The investor has to
spend the effort cost s~ 0 per period of search. With probability 0 c~c G 1 per period,
search results in a random matching with one of the entrepreneurs. With the remain-
ing probability 1- p search is not successful and no match occurs. When the investor
has found an entrepreneur, he is able to identify the risk of the entrepreneur's project.
One possible interpretation of the matching process ia that the enttepreneurs apply for
a loan. A fraction 1-{~ of the applications is `junk' and not worth financing under any
circumstances. The investor screens the applications to avoid bad loans and he has to
pay s for performing a credit-worthiness test.5
After classifying the risk category of a project, the investor may bargain with the
project owner about the financial terms under which he will invest his funds. Alterna-
tively, if he considers the project as too risky, he can quit and resume search. Of course,
the option to quit is important also for the bargaining solution, which will be described
below. The division of the available surplus will depend on this `outside option' when-
ever quittit~g constitutes a credible threat.
'I'here is a continuum of entrepreneurs. They have no initial wealth and rely on
outside~ (inance to undertake their projects. 'Ib focus on the search and bargaining
aspects of intermediation, we assume that the amount W is suffieient to finance each of
the projects. There is no efficiency gain in pooling the funds of several investors. This
assumption is important to illustrate that intermediation may constitute an efficient
allocation mechanism even in the absence of scale economies. Projects differ in their
riskiness. 'I'here are, two Lypes of projects, indexed i - A, B. A fraction 0 G~ G 1 of
entrepreneurs owns a project of type A; the other entrepreneurs have B-type projects.
When project i is undertaken, it generates the return X~ 0 with probability 0 G p; G 1;
with probability 1-p; it fails and yields zero return. We identify type A with a`low-risk'
project and type B with a`high-risk' project by assuming
Pn 1 Pa. (1)
In addition, we assume that the projects' expected profitability satisfies the following
condition:
~C - W~Pa G X G W~Pe - X. (2)
Only projects of type A yield an expected return that exceeds the required investment
W When the investor identifies a type B-project, he will refuse to supply his funds
since not investing at all would guarantee him a higher payoff. Direct investment will
not occur unless the investor is prepared to search for an entrepreneur of type A. This
reduces the number of possible equilibrium constellations. More importantly, it allows
us to demonstrate that intermediation may result in excessively risky investments thats
would uot be undertaken with direct finance.
The only difference between an investor and an intermediary is that the latter has
no initial wealth. An intermediary becomes active only if he succeeds in attracting the
funds of one of the investors. Since he is endowed with the same search technology as the
investors, his effort cost of search is s per period. His probability of being matched with
an entrepreneur of type A is pa in each period; the probability of finding a B-project is
p( I- o). Also, when the intermediary bargains with one of the entrepreneurs, the equi-
libriurn division of the surplus will follow the same rules as in the negotiations between
an investor and an entrepreneur. Thus, the intermediaries do not have a technological
comparative advantage over the investors.
There are, however, two important differences between direct and intermediated in-
vestment. First, in the case of intermediation the investor signs a contract with the
interrnecíiary before search takes place. 'fhis contract specifies the intermediary's repay-
ment obligation to the investor. It has an important impact on the net surplus that is
available in a match between the intermediary and an entrepreneur. Typically, inter-
mediation will reduce the share of the project return that the entrepreneur is able to
appropriate. Ex ante contracting between the investor and the intermediary generates a
precommitment effect that is not present in the case of direct investment.
The second feature that distinguishes direct and intermediated investment is related to
the investor's information. The investor is fully informed about the risk of his investment
only in the case of direct investment. Since he is unable to monitor the intermediary's
search and bargaining behavior, he remains uninformed about the project type selected
by the intermediary. The intermediary can, however, credibly communicate the event
of project failure. Appendix A proves that under these conditions delegated investment
involves the contractual specification of some fixed payment of the intermediary to the
investor after a successful investment. This form of contract is optimal even when the
contractual agreement between the intermediary and the entrepreneur is public informa-7
tion.
'1'o complete the description of the model, we have to describe the solution of the bar-
gaining problem that arises when the investor or the intermediary is matched with one
of the cnt,repreneurs. Note that the bargaining proceeds under perfect information after
the project risk has been identified. Our bargaining solution will employ the `outside
option principle', which can be derived from a non-cooperative model of the bargaining
process. The outside options describe the bargainers' disagreement payoffs. The investor
aud thc intrnnediary have Lhe outside option to terminate the bargaining process and
to search for another entrepreneur. We consider the entrepreneur's outside payoff as
negligible, because his chance to find anothe.r investor is effectively zero.
The bargaining solution is described by the following three properties: (i) an agree-
ment on financing the project is reached only if the expected gross return exceeds the
investor's (or the intermediary's) outside option payoff; (ii) in the case of an agreement,
each bargainer gets a half-share of the expected return unless this would assign the
investor (or the intermediary) less than his outside option; (iii) the agreement assigns
the investor (or the intermediary) his outside option payoff whenever this exceeds half
of the expected return. This solution can be derived formally from a non-cooperative
alternating offers game when the players' discount rates are approximately zero. In this
game the two parties exchange proposals and the prospective financier may react to the
entrepreneur's offers by breaking off negotiations (see Bester (1989), (1990)). Binmore,
Shaked, and Sutton (1989) report some experimental evidence that the prediction of this
model performs well in comparison with the conventional, cooperative Nash bargaining
solution.
3 Direct Investment
To investigate the conditions under which intermediation occurs in equilibrium, we firat
determine the investor's payoff in the absence of intermediation. He will search and di-rectly invest in a project only if this yields higher expected profit than saving his initial
wealth W. I,et V~ denote the investor's expected gross benefit from direct investment.
Direct investment is profitable when V~ ~ W. It follows that this investment strategy
requires the investor to continue searching until he finds an entrepreneur of type A. Since
p~X G W by assumption (2), the net surplus in a match with a type B-entrepreneur,
p~X - Vi, cannot be positive. Since the investor cannot gain by bargaining, he has to
quit upon identifying a high-risk project.
Only low-risk projects offer a positive bargaining surplus. In a match with an en-
trcpreneur of type A, the two parties bargain about the enttepreneur's payment obliga-
tion R~ after successful completion of the project. Given an agreement, the investor's
expected profit is pARA. According to the bargaining solution outlined in the foregoing
Section, the investor gets half of the expected return pAX as long as this dces not induce
him t,o quiL. If 0.5pAX ~ V~, quitting is not a credible option and the two parties find
Lhemselves in a situation of bilateral monopoly. In this case, they share the expected
investment ret.urn equally. If 0.5pAX G V~, however, the investor's payoff from invest-
ing has to tttatch his outsidc option, because otherwise he would quit. The bargaining
agreement is, therefore, given by
pARA - max[0.5pAX, V~]. (3)
When searching for an investment opportunity, the investor rationally anticipates that a
match with an A-type entrepreneur will result in the agreement described by (3). This
allows him to calculate his expected payoff from direct investment. At the beginning
of each period, he expects to find an A-project with probability pa. With probability
I- pa he does not find such a project and has to continue his search. Accordingly, his
expected payoff V~ equals
Vt -(I - crp)VI f a~ max(0.5pAX, V~] - s. (4)
To state the parameter constellations under which the investor gains from direct invest-
ment, we define the function
y~,(X) - ~p[0.5pAX - Wj. (5)9
Proposition 1: The investor's payo,~ Jrom direct investment is Vj -[ap0.5pqX -
s]~[rrp[. Ne preJers direct ínvestment to saving his wealth iJs G rpr(X).
It turns out that the investor cannot use the threat of not investing when he bargains
with an cntrepreneur of type A. As 0.5pqX ~ V~, his outside option remains ineffec-
tive. `I'hc int.uition for this observation is simply that the investor cannot improve his
sit.uation by breaking off negotiations. When he finds auother profitable project, he is
again in the same bargaining situation as before, after having wasted resources on search.
Direct investment is unattractive whenever 0.5pq G py. Indeed, assumption (2) im-
plics y~r(X) ~ 0 if and only if 0.5pq ) pB. Moreover, y~r(~) G 0. Thus the investor may
gain by s~arching for an investment only if 0.5pq ~ pB. In addition, his search cost s has
to bc sufficiently srnall and the return X has to be high enough.
To develop some intuition for the gains from intermediation, it is helpful to compare
the investor's decision rule with the socially efficient decision. By assumption (2) only
low-risk projects ge.nerate a positive social surplus, namely pqX - W. The expected
number of periods until such a project is discovered equals 1 -~ (1 - ap) f(1 - ap)~ f
... - 1~(ap). Accordingly, the social surplus from searching for a low-risk project equals
pqX - W- s~(ap) and so investment is socially profitable whenever s G ate[pqX - W].
A comparison with (5) reveals that the investor is less inclined to search than is socially
optimal. 'I'here is some range of parameter constellations where search is not privately
beneficial for the investor even though it creates a social benefit. Searching for a project
is a specific investment in the sense of Williamson (1975). The division of surplus arising
from bargaining provides too little incentive to select the efficient level of investment.
[:x ante contracting between the investor and the intermediary can, at least partially,
overcome this underinvestment problem. It creates a commitment effect that alters the
allocation of the project return.10
4 Delegated Bargaining
When the investor relies on intermediated investment, he transfers his funds to an in-
termediary. The intermediary then selects a project on the behalf of the investor. Since
the latter cannot directly monitor the intermediary's behavior, he has to provide appro-
priate contractual incentives. Let V,r~ denote the intermcdiary's payoff [rom searching
[or a project. The intermediary will search only if V,y is non-negative. It is, therefore,
not optimal to reward the intermediary by some up-front payment. Instead, he will be
rnotivated to search by the expected financial gain from a successful investment. This
gain is determined by the intermediary's contractual relations with the investor and the
entrepreneur.
The investor delegates the investment decision under a contract that specifies the
intermediary's repayment obligation R in the event of a successful investment. The con-
tract cannot condition on the project's riskiness since the investor is unable to monitor
the intermediary's investment decision. In Appendix A we show that this implies that
a fixed repayrnent obligation R constitutes an optimal contract. This is so even when
Ihe financial arrangement between the intermediary and the entrepreneur is publicly
obscrvablc. When the intcrmediary is matched with an entrepreneur of type i, he either
finances the project or continues to search. A project is undertaken if the two parties
agree on the payment R; that the intermediary receives should the return X realize.
Given R;, the intermediary's expected gain from financing a project equals p;(R; - R),
because he has to transfer the amount R to the investor.
The available gross surplus in a match between the intermediary and an i-type en-
trepreneur depe.nds on the initial contract R; it equals p;(X -R). This surplus determines
whcther thc project will be funded or not. As long as V;y G p;(X - R), there are gains
from undertakirrg the project and so the intermediary will negotiate with entrepreneur
i. The bargaining outcome obliges the entrepreneur to pay R; if the investment is suc-
cessful. The intermediary's expected payoff from the agreement is p;(R; - R). Using the11
same bargaining solution as in equation (3), we get
p;(R; - R) - max[0.5p;(X - R), VM]. (6)
Whcu VM ~ p;(X - R), there cannot be a mutually beneficial agreement between
the intermc~diary and entrepreneur i. In this case, the intermediary will quit because he
is better off by resuming search than by investing. Actually, he is indifferent between
funding a project and quitting if V~y - p;(X - R). As a tie-breaking rule, we assume
that he quits in this situation.
1'he bargaining solution allows us to calculate the intermediary's payoff from searching
V,y. His payoff in a match with an entrepreneur of type i equals 0.5p;(X - R) as long
as V,y c 0.5p;(X - R). Otherwise, he always gets Viy. Indeed, when 0.5p;(X - R) C
Viy C p;(X - R), the bargaining agreement matches his outside option payoff VM. If
V,y 1 p;(X - R), he gets Viy by quitting and continuing his search. Accordingly, the
intermediary's expected payoff from signing a contract with the investor equals
vM - (1 - ~)VM ~ ~a max[~.5pA1X - R), VM]
~t~(1 - a) max(0.5p~(X - R), V,y] - s.
The solution VM(R) of this equation depends on the initial contract R.
(7)
We denote the investor's expected payoff from intermediated investment by UI(R).
The initial contract R affects this payoff in two ways. First, there is a direct effect be-
cause the investor receives R upon completion of a successful project. The second effect
is related to the intermediary's search incentives. The likelihood of actually receiving R
depends on the intermediary's selection of project risks.
Proposition 2: The intermediary's payoff V~y(R) is decreasing in R. Moreover, V~(R)
G 0.5pA(X - R) for all R E[0, X]. The investor's payoff from intermediated investment
is U~(R) - [apA -F (1 - a)pe]R if 0 C V,~~(R) c pe(X - R), and U~(R) - p~R if
O~pH(,X-R)cVM(IZ).la
As a result., the intermediary will never quit a low-risk project. Of course, he may
opt.imally quit. a high-risk projecL to searcli for a low-risk project. The second part
of the I'roposition describes the intermediary's search behavior and its impact on the
investor's payoff. In the first case, the intermediary funds the first project he finds, inde-
pendently of its riskiness. Accordingl,y, the average probability of a successful investment
is ~pA ~(1 - a)pB. In the second case, he selects only low-risk projects, which succeed
with probability pA.
Interestingly, the investor cannot appropriate the entire gains from intermediation
if t~e wants to avoid investment in high-risk projects. That is, U~(R) - pAR implies
Vi(R) ~ 0. This follows from the last statement in the Proposition because V~(R) ? 0
implies R c X so that V~(R) ? pB(X - R) ~ 0. The intermediary is motivated to search
for projects of type A only if he benefits from quitting a B-project.
1'he~ investor's payoff U~(R) is noL necessarily increasing in R. It can happen that an
increase in li reduces U~(R). The reason is, of course, that such an increase may alter the
intermediary's search behavior. Only relatively low values of R provide an incentive to
search for low-risk investments. This observation is closely related to Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), who show that higher repayment obligations can increase the attractiveness of
high-risk investment opportunities.
Intermediation reduces the low-risk entrepreneurs' expected gains from batgaining.
By (6) and (3), their expected payoff is 0.5pA(X - R) in a match with the intermediary,
whereas they receivé 0.5pAX by negotiating directly with the investor. As a result of
int~,rmediat.ion, Lhe A-type entrepreneurs are Ieft with a smaller share of the project re-
tun~. Intermediation becomes attractive for the investor if he can appropriate a sufficient
fraction of the remaining share.13
5 Equilibrium Intermediation
I~inanc~ial intcnncdiation is viable if two conditions arc fulfilled. I~irst, thc invcstor's
e~xpcctcd payo(f from intcrnn~diated investmcnt must exceed the payolf LhaL he can get
on his own, either by direct investment or saving his wealth. Second, the intermediary
rnust receive an expected payoff [rom searching which is at least zero. Intermediation is
said to hc profitable if thcrc is an 0 G R C,X such that
U~(l~) 1 max(Vi, W~ and V,y(R) 1 0. (8)
Whenever Lhis condition is satisfied, the market equilibrium will be characterized by
int.crnuYliated investment. Of course, to determine how the investor and the interme-
diary dividc t.he pro(its from delegated scarch, we have to be more specific about thc
inte~ract.ion hCLW(en these agents. We will assume, that the intennediaries compete Cor
the invfstors' funds- The number of potential intermediaries is sufficiently large so that
some will not become active in equilibrium. In this situation, competition among the
intermediaries will determine some value R' that maximizes the investor's profit Uf(R)
subject to the intermediary's individual rationality constraint VM(R) ? 0.
Perfect competition dces not necessarily reduce the intermediaries' expected profit to
zero. Incentive considerations play an important role in the determination of R'. There
are two possible equilibrium candidates, fZo and RA, defined by
VM(Ra) - 0 and VM(RA) - PB(X - RA). (9)
In the foregoing Section it was shown that VM(RA) must be positive which implies that
Í~ ~ RA. By Proposition 2, in an equilibrium with R' - Ra the intermediary will finance
botlr types of projects. In contrast, R' - RA will induce him to quit high-risk projects
and to fund only low-risk investments.
Altogether, there are four possible equilibrium categories: (i) if intermediation is not
profitable and W ~ Vi, the investor will simply save his wealth; (ii) if intermediation is





Figure 1: Equilibrium for 0.5pA C pB
and Ui(Ra) ? U~(RA), intermediated investment takes place and R' - Ra; (iv) if inter-
mediation is profitable and U~(RA) 1 U~(Ra), there will be intermediation with R` - RA.
In what follows, we investigate which kind of equilibrium emerges under a given set
of parameter constellations. We start by considering the case where the difference in
project risks is relatively small so that 0.5pA G pB. Define
y~z(X) - 0.5p[apaX ~- (1 - a)pBX - W]. (10)
l3y ('L), y~z(~) G 0 G y~z(X) and so y~z(X) 1 0 for X sufficiently large.
Proposition 3: Lel 0.5pA G pB. Then the investor saves his wealth if s~ cpz(X). If
s G epz(X), there is intermediated investment with R" - Ro.
Figurc I illustrates how the equilibrium is related to the parameters s and X E
(~, X). The function s-,pz(X) defines the borderline between regions I and II. For
parameters in region I the investor saves his wealth. In region II the equilibrium is char-
acterized by dr.legated search; the intermediary earns zero expected profits and finances
the first project he encounters.In Section 3 it was shown that under the conditions of Proposition 3 the investor will
always prefer saving over direct investment. In region lI of Figure 1, therefore, interme-
diation generates a Pareto improvement. Both the investor and the entrepreneur, whose
project is undertaken, are better off than in the absence of intermediation. A remarkable
feature of the equilibrium is that in region 1I also ineíficient project have a chance to be
financed. These inefficiencies are caused by the incentive effects of intermediation. The
investor accepts that with probability 1- a his funds may be used to fund a high-risk
project. Since the difference between project risks is relatively srnall, he finds this more
attractive than enforcing search for low-risk investments through a contract RA G Ro.
We, now turn to the case 0.5pq 1 py. By Proposition 1, there is a range oí parameter
values of .4 aud X where the investor is bet,ter off by direct inv~tment than by saving his
wealth. It turns out that for these parameter values the profitability of intermediation
depends critically on the likelihood of finding a low-risk entrepreneur. We will first
concentrate on situations where a is relatively high. To describe the market equilibrium
for a 1 a-(0.5pA - py)~(1.5pA - py) 1 0, we define
~Ps(X) - {ra[0.5pAX - pyX - 0.5W f PyWIPa], (II)
and
4~a(X) - Fca[0.5pAX - pB,~(P~(1.5 - 0.5a) - (1 - ~)Pa
pA(1 - a) ~- 2~py
]. (12)
SÍncc` O.5)iA ~))y, y~;;(X) and y~4(X) arc positivc ovcr thc intcrval (X, X). Moreovcr,
therc is an X E(~, X) such that
~ps(X) - y~s(1C) - cp4(X) and y~z(X) ~ ~p3(X) ~ cp4(X) for X~ X. (13)
In Figure 2, the function y~3(.) is depicted for X G X; it represents the borderline
between region 1 and II1. The functions y~Z(.) and y~~(.) are depicted for X 1 X; they
separate region 11 from regions I and 111, respectively. The following result describes
the propcrties of equilibrium in the three regions of Figure 2.1 fi
Figure 2: Equilibrium for a 1 á~ 0
Proposition 4: Let a ~(0.5pA - pB)~(1.5p~ - pB) ~ 0. Then the investor saves his
weatth if s ? max[~pz(X), y~3(X)]. If ip~(X) G s G ipz(X)], there is intermediated invest-
ment acrith R' - Ro. Ijs G min[y~3(X), ep4(X)], there is intermediated investment with
R'-Rq.
Again, direct investrnent does not emergc as a possible equilibrium. This is so
because the riskiness of delegated investment is small for high values of a. Indeed,
max[~Z(X), y~3(X)] ~ ~pi(X) as long as a~ á. This means that region I in Figure
2, where the investor saves his wealth, is a subset of the patameter constellations where
saving occurs in the absence of intermediation. Intermediation, therefore, yields a Pareto
improvement in some parts of regions 11 and II1. Region III features a category of equi-
librium that was not viable in Figure 1. Here delegated search avoids exceasively riaky
investments and the active intermediaries earn positive profits. This is consistent with
perfect competition among the intermediaries because any R below RA would destroy
their incentives to contract exclusively with low-risk entrepreneurs. Competition drives
the intermediaries' payoff to zero only in region II. In fact, it is easily established that
the di(ference RQ - RA is increasing in the search cost s. From the investor's perspective
RA dominates Ra only if s is relatively small.
Finally, we consider the parameter constellation ~ -(0.5p~ - pg)~(1.5pA - pB) 117
s
Figure 3: Equilibrium for á 1 rr 1 0
a ~ 0. Let
4~sÍX) - Ira[0.5paX - peX
Pa
]~ ~s(X) - Ira[0.5paX - pBX 1-
a] (14)
0.5pa ~- pa 1 - 2a
Then yzs(X) ) ~ps(X) ~ 0 for all X E (~, X) because a G á. Moreover, there exist
.X~ and Xz with LC G X~ G Xz C X such that
V~~(Xi) - V~a(Xi) - 4's(X~) and y~i(Xz) - 4zz(Xz) - ~Ps(Xz). (15)
In Figure 3, ip3(.) represents the borderline between regions I and IV; the borderline
between regions III and IV is determined by the function ~ps(-). The functions ~pl(-)
and y~s(.) sc~parate region II! from regions I and 11, respectively. Finally, ~pz(-) con-
stitutes the dividing line between 1 and 11. The following statement characterizes the
equilibrium category in regions 1, II, III, and IV, respectively.
Proposition 5: Let rY G(0.5pa - pB)~(1.5pa - Pe). Then the investor saves his wealth
iJ s~ max[ept(X), y~z(X), y~3(X)]. !J ~s(X) C s e ~pz(X), there is infermediated in-
vestment with R' - Ro. Direct investment occurs iJy~s(X) G s G min[~p~(X), ~ps(X)].
Finalty, iJs G min[y~3(X), ~ps(X)], there is intermediated investment with R' - Ra.
In contrast. with the previous cases, there may now be a role for direct investment
in equilibrium. For parameter values in region 11] of Figure 3, the investor makes theIs
most profitable use of his wealth by searching for an A-type entrepreneur. intermediated
invcwtnu,nl willi Il' - Ir,r, whirh occ'urs in m};iun IV, is an inferiur upliou in rc~gion lll.
5inro It;r is delenninod by iure,ntivc resl.ricl.iuus, the di(fcrcucc V~ -pnlt~ incraascs with
s and becomes positive for s~ y~s(X). A similar argument explains why intermediation
with R' - I~ is restricted to parameter values in region I!. As n is relatively small,
there is a high risk that the intermediary will select an inefficient project. The investor
can profitably avoid this risk by direct investment if search is not too costly.
6 Conclusion
It has been shown that intermediation may emerge in financial markets even when it fails
to reduce transaction costs. Intermediation creates commitment advantages that affect
the distribution of the gains from trade. 1'he fund owners will rely on intermediated
investment when this allows them to appropriate a larger share of the investment re-
turn. The limits to the activity of the intermediaries are given by the negative incentive
effects of delegated information gathering. The trade-off between the commitment and
the incentive considerations endogenously determines the role of intermediation.
7'o illustrate this point, we have considered a highly stylized model of a financial
market. In particular, we have abstracted from the presence of scale economies, which
play an important role in other theories of financial intermediation. Our model, however,
may be extended to take account of such efficiency aspects. For instance, intermediation
will exhibit scale economies when Lhe funds of a single investor do not exhaust Lhe
capacity of an investment project. Then there is a cost advantage to pooling the funds
of several investors and delegating search to a single intermediary. The intermediary's
sc~arc:}i and bargaining strategy will depend also on the amount of funds that he has
attracted. This creates a coordination problem among depositors and it is not no longer
clear that competition among the intermediaries entails efficiency.19
Appendix A:
hi Ihi. aptN~iulix, wi, shuw I,haL the opl,imal coutract between the intermediary and the
invcstor spe~cifies a fixed payment obligation R for the intermediary. `I'his is true even
when the contract R; between the intermediary and entrepreneur i is public information.
Civen that t.he project risk selected by the intermediary is not observable to outsiders,
the most general contract between the investor and the intermediary is given by a func-
tion y(R;). The interpretation is that the intermediary has to pay 0 C y(R;) C X to the
investor when the project is successful.
Given a contract y(~), the solution R; of the bargaining game between entrepreneur i
and the intermediary has to satisfy
p~(R~ - y(Rt)) - max~O.Fip,(X - 7(1~)), VM]- (16)
Assumc that the solution !i'; is unique.
Cornpetition between the intermediaries will result either in some contract yo(.) or in
some contract yq(.), with
VM(~Yo) - ~ and V~y(yA) - PB(X - ~YA(RA))- (17)
Under yo(.) the iritermediary invests in the first project he finds; under yA(.) he
searches for a low risk project. First, consider the case where the investor gets a higher
payofí from yo(.) than from yq(.). In this case, the bargaining solution has to satisfy
!Rn - yo(R.t) - 0.5(X - 7o(Rn)), !~n - yo(Re) - 0.5(X - yo(Re)). (Ig)
This immediately implies ya(RA) - yo(RB). 'I'herefore, a simple non-contingent contract
Ra, with Ro - yo(RA) - yo(RB), generates the same payoffs as the contract yo(-). Next,
consider the case where contract yA(.) is optimal for the investor. Obviously, in this case,
the contracL yq(.) is equivalent to a non-contingent contract RA with RA - ya(Rq).
Appendix B:
Proof of Proposition 1: It is easily verified that Vj 1 0.5pqX yields a contradictionto .~ 1 0. 'I'he~rofon~, thc uniquc solution of (4) is Vi - [a~i0.5p~X - s]~[a~~]. The second
statement follows from the fact that V~ 1 W is identical to s G y~r(X). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: It is easily verified that V,~f ~ 0.5pA(X - R) yields a con-
Lrarlict.ion to s 1 0. '1'hc r.h.s. of equation (7) is a contimwus funct,ion g(V,~~, Ii) with
y(V~y, It) ~ VM for V~y small enough and g(V~y, R) G V,y for Viy large enough. Since
Og~OV,~~ G 1, there is a unique solution g(Viy, R) - Viy. Moreover, Viy(R) is strictly
de!creasing in R because g(V,~r, R) is strictly decreasing in R. The other statements follow
simply froni thc intcrmc~diary's scarch hchavior. Q.I?.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Since 0.5pA G pB irnplies s~ epr(X) there cannot be direct
investment in equilibrium. The solution of equation (9) yields
No - apaX t(I - a)PeX - 2s~u
Rn -
0.5pAX - paX - s~(F~a). 19
apA -1- ( I - a)Pe ' 0.5pA - pa
( )
As Rq C X implies 0.5pA ~ pg, there cannot be intermediated investment with R" - RA.
Intermediated investment with R' - Ra occurs if U~(Ra) -[apA ~(1 - a)pB]Ro ~ W.
This condition is equivalent to s G ~pZ(X). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Hy definition of ep~(.), one has Ul(Ro) 1 W if and only if
s G y~Z(X). Similarly, U~(Ra) - PARA ~ W if and only if s G ip3(X). It is easily verified
that a~(0.5pA - pg)~(1.5pA - pd) implies max[y~z(X), cp3(X)] ~ cpr(X). Thus saving
his wc~alth maximizes thc investor's payoff if s 1 max[y~z(X), y~3(X)].
liy defiuition of ~p4(.), one has U~(RA) ~ U~(I~) if and only if s G y~4(X). Accord-
ingly, Ui(RA) ~ max[U~(Ro), W] for s G min[~p3(X), ~p4(X)]. Moreover, s G cp4(X)
and a~~ implies s G eps(X), where y~s(-) is defined by (14). As s G cps(X),
is equivalent to U~(RA) ~ V~ this proves that intermediation with R~ is optimal for
s G min[y~3(X), y~~(X)].
For ip4(X ) G s G y~z(X), it is the case that U~(Ro) ~ max[U~(RA), W]. Moreover,
for a~ 0.5 and s G y~r(X) one has s G y~s(X), where yoó(.) is defined by (14). As
s G y~s(X) together with a 1 0.5 is equivalent to Uf(Ra) ~ V~, direct investment cannot
be optimal for a ? 0.5. Similarly, for r7 G a G 0.5, one has y~4(X) ~ cps(X). Therefore,zl
s) y~n(.~ ) implies .v ) cps(X ). As s~ y~s(X) together with á G cr G 0.5 is eyuivalent to
f~~(~ri~) ~ 6i, t.l~is proves Lhat intcrnicdiation with f7o is optimal for y~n(X) G s G y~!(X).
Q.1;.1).
Proof of Proposition 5: As s~ rnax[y~,(X), ~p2(X), cp3(X)j is equívalent to W 1
max[V~, Uf(RU), U~(RA)], the investor optimally saves his wealth under these parameter
constellations.
Note that a G 0.5 and y~s(X) G cp4(X) G ~ps(X) for all X E (~, X) because
cr G(0.5pA - pB)~(1.5pA - pB). By definition of y~5(-), UI(RA) 1 Vi is equivalent to
s G y~s(X). Moreover, for a G 0.5 one has Ui(Ra) ~ V~ if and only if s ~ rps(X).
Consider X2, as defined by (16). Then for X~ X2 it is the case that cp2(X) ~
y~,(x) 1 y~s(x). As u,(Ro) ~ w~ v, ;f y~,(x) C s G ~p~(x) and U,(Ro) 1 v, ~ w
i[ y~s(X) G s G cp,(X), intermediation with Ro is profitable if ~ps(X) G s G cp~(X).
Moreover, as s ~ cps(X) ~ y~n(X), one has Ui(Ra) 1 Ui(RA) so that intermediation with
R~, is optitnal.
Uirect investment is optimal if V~ 1 max[W,U~(Ro)] and V~ ~ Ul(RA). This is
cyuivalcnt to s G min[y~,(X),y~s(X)] and s~ y~s(X). F'or X, G X G XZ one has
:ps(X) G ~pr(X) G y~s(X) and for X~ G X one has cps(X) G y~s(X) G ~p,(X). This
proves that direct investment is optimal if y~s(X) G s G min(cp,(X), ips(X)j.
When x G X,, it is the case that y~,(X) G cp3(X) G y~s(X). Thus U~(RA) ~
max(V~, W] for X G X, if and only if s G cp3(X ). Moreover, s G ep3(X) G cps(X) G y~4(X)
implies U~(RA) ~ U~(Ra). If X ~ JC,, then ~ps(X) G y~3(X) G ~p,(X). Thus U~(RA) ~
max[V~, W] for X 1 X, if and only if s G eps(X). Moreover, s G ~ps(X) G ~p4(X)
again implies U~(RA) 1 U~(Ra). This proves that íntermediation with R' - RA is an
equilibrium if and only if s G min[y~3(X), y~s(X)j. Q.E.D.References
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